This paper offers for the first time evidence on the effect of ECB's unconventional monetary policy on economic expectations in Euro-area countries during the EU crisis. Our main findings indicate that conventional monetary policy has a positive effect on expectations and sentiment, while non-standard policies seem to have a negative effect. The second quantitative easing by the Fed had a positive effect on expectations mainly for the core Eurozone countries. Furthermore, ECB's conventional monetary policy is an important contributor to the variance of Eurozone country economic sentiment, indicating an effective expectations transmission channel. During the EU financial crisis, Euro-area sentiment seems to have a contribution of 29%-33% to the US sentiment variance, while during the EU crisis conventional monetary policy appears to be the single most important net sender of shocks to both the core and the peripheral countries. Together, our findings highlight the importance of both conventional and unconventional monetary policy in the determination of economic expectations.
Introduction
The main aim of the European Central Bank (ECB) is to maintain price stability, defined as a year-on-year increase in consumer prices of below 2%, over the medium term; furthermore, it contributes to the stability of the financial system within the Euro-area by monitoring developments in the banking and financial sectors. The main instrument of monetary policy by central banks is their influence over money market interest rates which affect expectations of future official interest rates, the actions of economic agents, and ultimately the evolution of output or prices. As the ECB itself acknowledges, the expectations transmission channel of monetary policy has gained importance during the recent decades. For instance, a high degree of central bank credibility can have a strong impact on price developments by guiding economic agents' expectations, and thus "….understanding the transmission mechanism is crucial for monetary policy (p.61, The Monetary Policy of the ECB (2011), available at: http://www.ecb.europa.eu).
Many authors have also stressed the importance of monetary policy on financial markets, risk aversion, and expectations, and have argued that understanding the links between asset prices and monetary policy is crucial in understanding the monetary policy transmission mechanism (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005) . Furthermore, as Lutz (2015) argues, there is a necessity to understand the relationship between investor sentiment and monetary policy since central banks are contemplating the use of monetary policy tools in order to tackle the volatility associated with asset bubbles and financial crises. Indeed, during the recent financial crises in the US and the EU, official policy rates approached the zero lower bound and, as a result, central banks in developed economies resorted to unconventional monetary policy mechanisms in order to tackle financial market volatility and preserve financial stability (see, among others, Gambacorta, et al., 2014; Fawley and Neely, 2013) . This is the first paper, to the best of our knowledge, that examines the effect of ECB's unconventional and conventional monetary policy during the EU crisis on economic expectations. For monetary policy to achieve the target of price stability it has to affect expectations, in other words, affect consumer and economic confidence. We ask whether ECB's monetary policy does that, since previous studies on unconventional policies focus on the Fed and US data. Note that, although both central banks have similar long term goals under their constitution, they may be using different policies to meet these goals, given that they are facing different challenges.
For example, the ECB is at present trying to deal with slow growth and deflation risk, while the FED is trying to maintain the established growth and economic stability.
Given the absence of any mechanisms that can tackle the side effects of this strategic divergences, empirical evidence that sheds light on the effects of non-standard policies is crusial in understanding its effectiveness. Morover, we also examine the effect of the Fed's unconventional policy on economic expectations in the Euro-area and sentiment spill-overs from the US to the Euro-area and visa versa. Note that many previous studies document the effect of economic agent expectations (measured as consumer confidence and/or economic sentiment) on economic activity, economic and investment behavior, and asset prices. For example, Benhabib et al. (2016) , present a model where shocks in sentiment affect output, employment, and the business cycle; Chen (2011) , finds that a bear equity market regime has a higher probability of occurring when there is a lack of consumer confidence; Hwang (2011) finds that the way Americans feel about a country affects US investor demand for this country's securities and leads to a deviation from fundamental values (see also, among others, Bachmann and Sims, 2012; Baker and Wurgler, 2007; Brown and Cliff, 2004; Fisher, and Statman, 2003; Neal and Wheatley, 1998) .
We measure the expectations of economic agents in the Euro-area with the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), that is compiled by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission (DG ECFIN). The ESI is a composite index with constituents five sectoral confidence indicators (industrial confidence, services confidence, consumer confidence, construction confidence, retail trade confidence) that are seasonally adjusted balances of answers to surveys within each sector. Empirical research shows that sentiment indexes, such as the ESI for the EU and the Michigan Survey for the US, may contain information that is not already reflected in other macroeconomic variables. For example, Carroll at al. (1994) find that sentiment forecasts spending; they argue that sentiment is an independent driving force in the economy since it reflects the economic outlook (see, among others, Acemoglu and Scott, 1994; Matsusaka and Sbordone, 1995; Bachmann and Sims, 2012; Barsky and Sims, 2012) .
For the empirical analysis, we use a Panel Vector AutoRegression (PVAR) methodology, with all variables in the system treated as endogenous (VAR), while allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity. With this method we are able to combine the traditional VAR model with a panel-data approach and treat all variables in the system as endogenous, as in a VAR model, but at the same time allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity, as in panel-data estimations (see, Love and Zicchino, 2006) . Gambacorta et al. (2014) use the PVAR methodology to examine the macroeconomic effects of unconventional monetary policies (for a brief discussion of these policies see next section) in a sample of eight advanced economies and find a positive effect on economic activity and prices following exogenous increases in central bank balance sheets. Our sample consists of nine Eurozone countries that we group in two sub-samples denoted for simplicity as the "core" countries (Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium and Austria) and the "peripheral" countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece). We combine the sentiment indicators with a set of macroeconomic and financial variables such as equity prices, industrial production, unemployment, trade balance, consumer price indexes.
Our main findings indicate that conventional ECB monetary policy has a positive and significant effect on EU expectations and sentiment, while unconventional policies seem to have a negative and significant effect; the first quantitative easing by the Fed has a negative impact while the second quantitative easing has a positive effect, mainly for the core Eurozone countries. Furthermore, ECB conventional monetary policy is an important contributor to the variance of European sentiment, especially during the 2007-2010 period, while Fed's conventional monetary policy also seems to contribute to the variance in sentiment, in conjunction with ECB policies. This indicates that the expectations transmission channel is succesfull in shaping expectations. As regards to expectation spill-over effects, during the 2007-2010 period we detect an important effect of US sentiment mainly on peripheral Euro-area country sentiment, while during the EU financial crisis, Euro-area sentiment seems to have a contribution of 29%-33% to the US sentiment variance. Finally, we find that during the EU crisis conventional monetary policy appears to be the single most important net sender of shocks to both the core and the peripheral countries. During the US crisis, for all countries, the ESI is the single most important net sender of shocks to both core and peripheral countries.
The paper contributes to the relevant literature on the effects of monetary policy. For example, Bernanke and Kuttner find that the Fed's monetary shocks have a significant impact on expected excess equity returns and suggest that investors may overreact, or be very sensitive, to monetary shocks. This result is consistent with Kurov (2010) who finds that the Fed's monetary policy decisions have a significant effect on US investor sentiment, or with Bekaert et al. (2013) who document a relationship between investor risk aversion and monetary policy. Lutz (2015) studies the effect of Fed's conventional and unconventional monetary policy on investor sentiment and finds that during conventional policies a surprise drop in the rate has a positive impact on investor sentiment that lasts several months; unconventional monetary policy shocks have a similar impact on economic sentiment.
Our findings of a positive effect of conventional policy on sentiment are consistnet with previous findings, however, the finding of a negative effect of unconventional policy on sentiment is not. Lutz (2015) finds that Fed's unconventional monetary policy shocks have a similar impact on economic sentiment as the conventional policies. An explanation for the differences in the results may be the different nature of unconventional policies the two central banks followed after 2010. For example, one should make the distinction between the subprime crisis in the US (2007) (2008) (2009) during which the reaction of the Fed and the ECB was similar, and the EU crisis that erupted in 2010 where there have been important differences in the policies employed.
More specifically, as Gros, et al. (2012) point out, while the Fed (and the Bank of England) responded with QE policies signaling a strong will to undertake credit risk, the ECB responded with an approach that could be described as 'credit easing'; that is, the massive response to the crisis with the Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) and the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) was also targeted at minimizing ECB's own risk (p. 5). It must be noted that while at the time the focus in the US was on the economic cycle and economic recovery, in the Euro area increased uncertainty about a Greek default, the effective isolation from the inter-bank market of some peripheral country banking systems, and the restoration the monetary policy transmission mechanism, was the priority (for a detailed discussion see Gross, et al. 2012 ). In the longer term, however, the evolution of the ESI for the EU overtime (see Figure 1) indicates that, despite sharp sentiment decreases during the US crisis in the US and during the outbreak of the EU crisis, sentiment seems to be in an upward channel. In addition, empirical evidence indicates that the ECB policies had a positive effect on asset prices and reduced bank credit (Fratzscher et al., 2014) . Also, Falagiarda, et al. (2015) , in a study on non euro-area EU countries, argue that for the SMP announcements portfolio rebalancing and signalling channels were important in policy transmission, while for the the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) the confidence transmission channel reduced redenomination risk. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly reviews unconventional monetary policy actions, section 3 presents the data and the testing methodologies, section 4 presents the results on the impact of monetary policy on sentiment, section 5 presents the results on sentiment spill-over effects, section 6 presents impulse response functions and robustness tests, while section 7 concludes the paper.
Unconventional Monetary Policies
The Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006; Fisher and Statman, 2003) . For the empirical analysis we use the indexes in levels; however, as a robustness test, we also employ the differences of the index from the optimism-threshold (i.e. 100, see Georgoutsos and Migiakis, 2013) . The results are qualitative the same.
Data and Testing Methodology
In order to measure the impact of conventional monetary policy shocks we use the EONIA (Euro Overnight Index Average) and the FED Fund rates for the Eurozone and the US respectively (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Romer and Romer, 2004;  among others). We also consider a number of variables that gauge economic output and financial market behavior (Lutz, 2014; Stock and Watson, 2002 ; among others), such as Industrial Production (IP), the unemployment rate (Unemloym), the trade balance (Tradebal), the consumer price index (CPI), stock price indexes for the Eurozone countries and the US (Stock_ret). Note that consumer price inflation in the euro area is measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), which is compiled by Eurostat and the national statistical institutes in accordance with harmonised statistical methods, and that the ECB aims to maintain annual inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Appendix III presents a description of the variables and all the time series are transformed to stationary.
For the empirical analysis, in order to capture the announcement effect of unconventional policy measures we use impulse dummies. A first concern is that the announcement was sufficiently unexpected and significant enough to affect markets.
To this end we focus only on ECB announcements related to unconventional policy measures (SLTROs, SMP, OMT) that were covered in the front page of the Financial Times on the following day. For example, the dummy AN_OMTt is equal to one on the day the ECB President Draghi made his speech in London (26 th July 2012;
"Whatever it takes") and on the day of the OMT announcement (6 th September 2012). In (1), the PVAR shown, does not allow for dynamic interdependencies and cross sectional heterogeneities, since and 1 are the same across all units, or for static interdependencies since we assume that ( , ) = 0, for ≠ (see Love and Zicchino, 2006; Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013; Grossmann et al., 2014) . We use the Love and Zicchino (2006) code for Panel VAR estimation in STATA, and all of the results are estimated using a PVAR with one lag. The evidence presented from this
analysis is mostly based on the results from the impulse-response functions and the variance decompositions. Furthermore, we use a Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of residuals, since the actual variance-covariance matrix of the errors is highly unlikely to be diagonal. In this case, it becomes difficult to isolate shocks to one of the VAR errors, i.e. we have to decompose the residuals in a way that they become orthogonal. With the Cholesky ordering we assume that the most exogenous variable is the Eonia rate and the least exogenous is the Economic Sentiment of each sample market.
An important restriction is that the underlying structure is the same for each crosssectional unit, which however, may not hold. Thus, we allow for "individual heterogeneity" in levels by introducing fixed effects. Simple-mean differencing will provide biased estimators, as fixed effects are correlated with the repressors due to lags of the dependent variables. In order to avoid that we follow Love and Zicchino (2006) , that is, we introduce the forward mean-differencing procedure also known as the Helmert transformation. According to Arellano and Bover (1995) , the Helmert transformation removes only the forward mean. Since, dependent and lagged variables remain orthogonal we can estimate the coefficients by using system GMM.
To analyze the impulse-response functions we need an estimate of their confidence intervals. Since the matrix of impulse-response functions is constructed from the estimated VAR coefficients, their standard errors need to be taken into account. We calculate standard errors of the impulse-response functions and generate confidence intervals which have been produced by Monte Carlo simulations with 200 replications. Therefore, whenever the zero line lies outside the confidence bands there is evidence of a statistically significant response to the shock inflicted.
The Impact of Monetary Policy on Sentiment
In Table 1 , Panel A, we present descriptive statistics for the main variables. The panel unit root tests of Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003; IPS test) suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, for all sample variables (these results are not reported here but are available upon request). The next step is the lag selection for the PVAR model. In order to decide on the lag structure we use the overall coefficient of determination (CD). The results are presented in Table 1 (Panel B) and indicate that the optimal lag structure is one lag. In Panel C (Table 3) 
QE1, QE2, QE3).
The results indicate that QE1 announcements had a negative effect on Eurozone sentiment (last column, Panel A); for instance, the coefficient of QE1 is -1.9701 (a=1%). QE1 had the same impact on the sentiment of core countries, however, QE2 had a positive impact with a coefficient of 0.8110 (a=5%). None of the Fed's unconventional policies had a statistically significant impact on peripheral country sentiment (last column, Panel C).
We next examine in more detail the impact of conventional ECB and Fed monetary policy on sentiment using variance decomposition analysis. The results for the ECB are presented in Table 4 . The Table presents The results for the Fed conventional policy (Fed funds rate) are presented in Table 5 , which is organized in the same way as Table 4 . The Fed funds rate is listed first in the Cholesky ordering as the most exogenous in the system (US factor in the European set). As we can see in Table 5 , during the full sample period (Panel A), the Fed funds rate has approximately the same contribution to the three different country groups. will to undertake credit risk, the ECB responded with an approach that could be described as 'credit easing'. It must be noted that while at the time the focus in the US was on the economic cycle and economic recovery, in the Euro area increased uncertainty about a Greek default, the effective isolation from the inter-bank market of some peripheral country banking systems, and the restoration the monetary policy transmission mechanism, was the priority. Thus, despite the possible longer term positive effects of the ECB policies, ate the time the short term effect on expectations was negative. Furthermore, ECB conventional monetary policy is an important contributor to the variance of European sentiment, especially during the 2007-2010 period, while Fed's conventional monetary policy also seems to contribute to the variance in sentiment, in conjunction with ECB policies.
Spill-Over Effects
An related interesting issue is whether there are sentiment spill-over effects from the Euro-area to the US and visa versa. In order to investigate this issue, we estimate the PVAR and procced with variance decomposition analysis as above. The models include all variables, however, we report here only the results for the sentiment indexes (the rest of the results are available upon request). Table 6 reports Variance Decomposition Analysis results with a focus of possible sentiment spill-overs from the US to EU. That is, we report the contribution of US sentiment to the sentiment variance of Eurozone, Core, and Peripheral countries, for the sample periods. The Table is organized in a similar manner to Table 5 . The Michigan sentiment index is listed first to the Cholesky ordering as the most exogenous in our set (US variable).
During the 2007-2010 period (Panel A), we detect an important effect of US sentiment on peripheral EU country sentiment, i.e. US sentiment contributes to 11.17% to the total peripheral sentiment variance decomposition. During the financial crisis in the Eurozone (2010-2012) the effect of US sentiment appears more significant for Eurozone and peripheral countries, with a contribution of 12.35% and 13.97%, respectively, to total variance. Table 7 reports results with a focus of possible sentiment spill-overs from the EU to the US. Core Eurozone sentiment appears to have a significant contribution to US sentiment: its contribution is approximately 25% to the variance of US sentiment. This is mainly due to the events that took place the later sub-period. During the 2007-2010 period (Panel A) the total contribution is of minor importance (2%-6%), however, during the EU financial crisis (Panel B) the contribution of EU sentiment to the variance of US sentiment rises to 29% -33%.
Next, we estimate the total spillover effect caused by each variable in the system to every other variable, as well as its aggregate effect. To this end, we employ the Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) methodology who, within a generalized VAR methodology, suggest a measure of total and directional volatility spillovers. In their framework forecast-error variance decompositions are invariant to variable ordering. The matrices of potential spillover effects are presented in Table 8 : Panels A and B present results for the US crisis for the core and peripheral countries, respectively, while Panels C and D present results for the EU crisis for the core and peripheral countries, respectively. Table is to This holds also for the peripheral countries (Panel B) where the Eonia rate is the factor with the second biggest impact (56.59) with sentiment being first (104.28).
One way to read the
When one considers the net contribution of each variable (in the Net row), that shows the difference between the shocks that each variable receives and sends to the system, we can see that during the US crisis for the core countries (Panel A) the Eonia rate is a net receiver of shocks (-8.88%), while for the peripheral countries (Panel B) is a net sender of shocks (9.51%) in the system. The ESI during the US crisis is the single most important net sender of shocks to both core (69.84) and peripheral (73.97) countries. During the EU crisis (Panels C and D) the Eonia rate appears to be the single most important net sender of shocks to both the core (22.28) and the peripheral (28.03) countries, among all the seven variables we employ. Sentiment does not appear to be important.
Overall, the results in this section suggest the existence of bi-directional sentiment spill-over effects between the US and the EU; in addition, during the EU crisis the Eonia rate appears to be the single most important net sender of shocks to both the core and the peripheral countries. During the US crisis, for all countries, the ESI is the single most important net sender of shocks to both core and peripheral countries.
These results are consistent with the notion that monetary policy and economic expectations have been significant contributors to the outcome of the EU financial crisis. [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] , the pattern is quite similar across the countries, i.e. the positive response to a shock in Eonia indicates that economic agents react positively to a shock in Eonia. A similar pattern is observed when we examine the response of European expectations to a shock in the Fed fund rate (Figure 4) , with the exception of the third sub-period (2010) (2011) (2012) . In other words, changes in the interest rates seem to have generated a positive shift in economic expectations.
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs)
Impulse
Conclusions
The main aim of the European Central Bank (ECB) is to maintain price stability and contribute to the stability of the financial system within the Euro-area, with the expectations of economic agents within the Euro-area being an important monetary policy transmission channel. This paper examines the effect of ECB's conventional and unconventional monetary policies during the EU crisis on economic expectations.
We measure the expectations of economic agents with the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) and employ a Panel Vector AutoRegression (PVAR) methodology.
Our sample consists of nine Eurozone countries that we group in two sub-samples denoted for simplicity as the "core" countries (Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium and Austria) and the "peripheral" countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece). We combine the sentiment indicators with a set of macroeconomic and financial variables such as equity prices, industrial production, unemployment, trade balance, consumer price indexes.
Our main findings indicate that conventional ECB monetary policy has a positive and significant effect on EU expectations and sentiment, indicating an effective expectations transmission channel, while unconventional policies seem to have a negative and significant effect; the first quantitative easing by the Fed has a negative impact while the second quantitative easing has a positive effect, mainly for the core Eurozone countries. Furthermore, ECB conventional monetary policy is an important contributor to the variance of European sentiment, while Fed's conventional monetary policy also seems to contribute to the variance in sentiment. We also detect sentiment spill-over effects, and find that during the EU crisis conventional monetary policy appears to be the single most important net sender of shocks to both the core and the peripheral countries. During the US crisis, for all countries, the economic sentiment is the single most important net sender of shocks to both core and peripheral countries. Notes to Appendix 1 Column "Event" describes the policy announcement; "Financial Times Headline" indicates the title ofthe "top story" on the front page of the Financial Times; "Headline Article" indicates where the ECB action is mentioned in the top story on the front page of the Financial Times (title, subtitle or main text); "Front page"indicates where the ECB action is mentioned in the on the front page of the Financial Times, if not in the "top story" (title, subtitle or main text). "VIX" indicates the change in the VIX on the day of the announcement;"dummy" indicate the impulse dummy capturing announcements effects in the baseline analysis. Notes to Table 6  Table 6 reports Variance Decomposition Analysis results with a focus of possible sentiment spill-overs from the US to EU. That is, we report the contribution of US sentiment to the sentiment variance of Eurozone, Core, and Peripheral countries, for three sample periods. The Table is organized in a similar manner to Table 5 . The models include all variables, however, we report here only the results for the sentiment indexes. See also Notes to Notes to Table 7  Table 7 reports Variance Decomposition Analysis results with a focus of possible sentiment spill-overs from the EU to US. That is, we report the contribution of US sentiment to the sentiment variance of Eurozone, Core, and Peripheral countries, for three sample periods. The Table is organized in a similar manner to Table 5 . The models include all variables, however, we report here only the results for the sentiment indexes. See also Notes to Table 5 . Table 8 Variables in the first column are the impulse origin, while in the top row are the respondents to the shock. Values in the matrix represent the average cumulated spillover effect. The cumulative impact is bound between 0 and 1. A value of 0.5 means that the response variable will be impacted in the same direction with an intensity of 50% the initial unexpected shock in the impulse variable. In the last column we have the aggregated impact sent (Sum OUT) by each row variable and on the bottom row the aggregated spillover received (Sum IN) by each column variable. The bottom-right cell (in bold) shows total spillover in the system (by dividing this value to the total number of non-diagonal cells, i.e. 7x6, we obtain the contagion index of the core and peripheral group for the two different periods. The "Net" row represents the net spillover of each variable (Net Spillover=Sum OUT-Sum IN). 
